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The Blanchard and Leigh (hereafter BL) (2013, 2014) studies of the size of fiscal multipliers 
in European countries during the early 2010s prompted an intense debate among academics 
and policy makers concerning the effects of fiscal policy on output during a period of economic 
crisis.   The empirical methodology of the BL contribution focussed on a regression of the 
forecast error in the output (GDP) growth rate on the planned fiscal consolidation of individual 
member states.   Under rational expectations and assuming forecasters used the correct model 
for forecasting, the coefficient on the fiscal consolidation variable is expected to be zero.   BL 
argued, however, that if forecasters underestimated the size of fiscal multipliers then there 
would be a negative and significant coefficient on the fiscal variable, which would explain the 
“growth disappointments” experienced by countries undertaking substantial fiscal 
retrenchment.    
Based on a sample of 26 European countries for the period 2010/2011, their baseline coefficient 
estimate on the fiscal consolidation variable was -1.1.   They employed a series of robustness 
tests, which backed up their central finding of a significant negative coefficient on the measure 
of consolidation.   During the most severe of the European recession (2010 and 2011), 
therefore, BL interpret the true value of the multiplier as being about 1.6, that is the “normal 
times” multiplier of 0.5 plus the 1.1 value.   Consequently, BL claim the substantial fiscal 
contraction of the period had a much more negative impact on output growth than was expected 
a priori.   They also contend that the scale of their multiplier estimates could be conditional on 
the two-year period over which they were estimated, one of deep recession in Europe. 
As member states respond to the damaging economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic 
through fiscal stimulus, and in light of the BL findings for the last crisis, it is important to 
examine whether shortcomings still arise with official forecasters’ estimates of fiscal 
multipliers in the EU.1   If official multipliers continue to be estimated inaccurately then it will 
be difficult to quantify the extent to which fiscal policy would address reduced demand in the 
economy arising from the effects of the pandemic.   In this paper, we update the BL analysis 
by applying their model to a sample of 26 EU member states over the period 2013–2018 using, 
in one dataset, the projections of ministries of finance (in their Stability and Convergence 
 
1 The IMF (2020a) estimated in April 2020 that the fiscal cost of the healthcare response to the pandemic and tax 
and expenditure measures to support the economy would cost €3.3 trillion globally.   Discretionary fiscal measures 
taken by EU member states amounted to 3.1 per cent of EU-27 GDP.   The annex to the report notes the historically 




Programmes, henceforth SCPs) and, in a second dataset, those of the European Commission 
(in its Spring Forecasts).2   GDP outturn data are sourced from the EU AMECO database.   
Assessing the accuracy of fiscal multipliers for this period provides a timely insight into how 
efficiently fiscal policy may or may not be implemented presently.  
The analysis is conducted over a period where changes to the EU fiscal rules enacted, in part, 
to support better macroeconomic and fiscal forecasting in the wake of the 2008-2012 financial 
and sovereign bond market crisis had taken effect.   The European Semester was adopted in 
2010 with the purpose of improving ex-ante economic and budgetary policies in the EU.   Its 
introduction coincided with a new “six pack” (of five regulations and one directive) intended 
to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact and its “preventive arm” geared to providing 
detailed scrutiny of member states’ budgetary and macroeconomic forecasts.   A concern that 
had been voiced in the policy literature was of a bias in official forecasts within Europe, with, 
for example, Jonung and Larch (2006), Frankel (2011), and Frankel and Schreger (2013) 
illustrating an “optimism bias” in official growth forecasts.   In response to such academic 
studies and the experience of forecasting during the crisis (exemplified in BL’s findings), the 
Fiscal Compact, effective since 2013, provided for independent oversight of member states’ 
forecasting at the national level, including a role for independent forecasting authorities.   BL 
also contend that official forecasts may improve due to learning, including from the 2010-2011 
experience.   This paper focuses then on the recent forecasting performance of member states 
and the European Commission against the background of the experience of the last economic 
crisis and where increased fiscal and forecasting oversight is in place at national and EU level.      
Our findings indicate that official forecasters continue to miscalculate the size of fiscal 
multipliers.   Unlike BL, however, we find that forecasters now overestimate the effect of fiscal 
policy on output growth, as opposed to underestimating it.   Our econometric results hold 
irrespective of whether the forecasts used are those of the member states or of the European 
Commission and are robust to the inclusion of control variables.   The concluding section of 
the paper discusses the policy implications, both in general and in the new economic 
circumstances arising from the Covid-19 epidemic, of these results. 
 
2 SCPs outline governments’ economic outlook and fiscal policy over the medium term.   They are submitted for 
peer review and assessment by the European Commission in April of each year.   Consequently, we will be 
assessing how accurately member states adjudge the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on the output growth 
rates of their respective national economies.   The Spring Forecasts of the European Commission can shed light 





2.        Methodology and data 
Since our panel dataset comprises yearly observations, we adapt BL’s (2013) basic regression 
specification as follows3: 
Forecast Error of ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜌 ∆𝐹𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
where ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 denotes the growth rate of real GDP (Y) in member state 𝑖 in year 𝑡 and the 
associated forecast error is ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑓{∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡}, with 𝑓 denoting the forecast contained in the 
member state’s SCP (or the European Commission’s Spring Forecast) for year 𝑡, which is 
conditional on Ω𝑡, the information set available early in year 𝑡.   The variable ∆𝐹𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 is the 
planned change in the General Government structural budget balance (SBB), measured as a 
percentage of potential GDP, in year 𝑡, as included in the SCP (or Spring Forecast) for that 
year.   Under the null hypothesis that the ex-ante fiscal multipliers used for forecasting were 
accurate, the estimated 𝜌 should be zero.   If the coefficient is significantly different from zero 
then forecasters are still misjudging fiscal multiplier values in the post-crisis era. 
We estimate (1), and variants of it, using panels of yearly planned changes-in-SBB, GDP 
growth rate forecast errors and other data collected for 26 member states between 2013 and 
2018.   GDP outturn data, needed for the calculation of the growth forecast error on the left-
hand-side of (1), are from the EU AMECO database.   The starting date of 2013 is appropriate 
with harmonised SBB data being available from that time and the post-crisis enhancement of 
the EU fiscal rules having been largely completed by then.   Of the 28 EU member states, 
Greece did not provide SCPs in any of years from 2013 to 2018 and thus is not included in the 
dataset.   The UK is excluded as there are missing data in its SCPs and its budgetary year 
straddles calendar years.   Of the remaining 26 member states, Cyprus only provided SCPs 
from 2016 to 2018 and Croatia for the years 2015 to 2018.   A particular difficulty arises for 
Ireland and Malta for 2015.   Both countries had extremely elevated output growth rates and, 
consequently large GDP forecast errors, in that year.   Ireland had a real GDP growth rate 
outturn of 25.2 per cent in 2015 and Malta had a growth rate of 10.8 per cent.   Such growth 
rates were linked to tax-related decisions of multi-national firms (see Christian Aid (2017) and 
FitzGerald (2018) for more on this).   Consequently, given the extreme GDP growth forecast 
 
3 Accordingly, we are assessing the size of a fiscal multiplier over the course of one year whereas BL estimate at 
a two-year horizon.   Fiscal multiplier values are expected to differ between different horizons (see Spilimbergo 
et al., 2009, for a review) but it is appropriate and instructive to consider errors in the a priori measurement of 




errors arising from these outturns, the observations for 2015 for Ireland and Malta are dropped 
from the data sample. 





























































The baseline dataset then comprises 149 observations (i.e., N = 149).   Scatter plots of both the 
SCP and Spring Forecast data are shown in the two panels of Figure 1.   The period was one 
where member states engaged in both fiscal consolidation, marked by positive values in the 
change in SBB, and loosening in fiscal policy, shown by negative values for the same variable.   
The fitted lines in both graphs suggest a positive relationship arising between the change in the 
SBB and the GDP growth rate forecast error.   The next section provides formal tests of the 
relationship between the two variables. 
3. Econometric Results 
(i) Baseline results 
Our baseline estimates of equation (1), using OLS and country fixed effects and the 149 
observation datasets, are presented in the first line of panel (a) (for the SCPs) and panel (b) (for 
the Spring Forecasts) of Table 1.   For the SCPs, the 𝜌 estimate is 0.598 (with a t-statistic of 
3.650) arising, while that for the Spring Forecasts is 0.565 (with a t-statistic of 3.138).   The R-
square measure of goodness-of-fit is just over 0.34 in both cases.4   The significance and size 
of these coefficients indicate that forecasters at national and EU level miscalculated the effect 
of fiscal policy on output growth and to a similar degree.   The sign of the 𝜌 coefficient is 
positive.   This means that whereas BL find fiscal multipliers to be underestimated during 2010-
2011, the opposite occurred in subsequent years with an over-estimation of the fiscal multiplier 
arising.   The estimated coefficient values indicate that for every one percentage point change 
in the SBB, the outturn GDP growth rate is about 0.6 per cent different from that forecast. 
(ii) Controlling for outliers and member states included   
As per BL, we subject this finding of a significant positive 𝜌 coefficient to a series of robustness 
tests across Tables 1 and 2.   In the first instance, we consider whether the 𝜌 estimate may be 
sensitive to outliers and report the results in Table 1.   Given the potential for significant 
heteroscedasticity in the regression residuals owing to such observations, a weighted least 
squares (WLS) estimator is applied to a re-estimation of (1).   WLS improves the precision of 
the estimates by “down-weighting” observations that are known to have a high residual 
 
4 An F-test on the inclusion of the country fixed effects (as reported in the right-hand-side column of the table) 




variance.5   With this estimation method, the SCP and Spring Forecast estimates of 𝜌 are lower, 
at 0.549 and 0.380 (see Table 1), respectively, but remain highly significant.   Another means 
of addressing outlier values is quantile regression, which differs from OLS in minimising the 
sum of the squares of the residuals around the median rather than the mean in the estimation 
process.   Table 1 shows it provides estimates of 𝜌 close to those of the WLS estimations. 
Table 1. Results of the baseline regression, alternative estimators and different samples 
 N 𝜌 
(T-ratio) 
R-square F-test on 
fixed effects 
(P-values) 
a. SCPs     
Baseline  149 0.598 (3.650) 0.341 0.002 
WLS 149 0.549 (6.150) 0.341  0.002 
Quantile regression 149 0.512 (2.846) n.a. 0.000 
All IE and MT excluded 139 0.456 (2.726) 0.330 0.000  
Euro area member states 100 0.697 (2.891) 0.375 0.002 
     
b. Spring Forecast     
Baseline  149 0.565 (3.138) 0.345 0.001 
WLS 149 0.380 (3.165) 0.339 0.027 
Quantile regression 149 0.444 (2.191) n.a. 0.000 
All IE and MT excluded 139 0.400 (2.212) 0.35 0.000 
Euro area member states 100 0.753 (2.963) 0.386 0.002 
 
As well as using alternative regression methods, we also use different samples (with estimation 
by OLS with country fixed effects) to assess further the finding that fiscal multipliers were 
overestimated in the post-financial crisis period.   In the first instance, we drop all Ireland and 
Malta observations from the dataset.   As well as particularly large outlier values in 2015, those 
two member states had larger average GDP growth forecast errors than other member states 
over the 2013 to 2018 period.6   The two panels of Table 1 show significant 𝜌 estimates of 
 
5 The weighting is done by using the residual variances from the initial panel data estimator. See Leamer (2010) 
and Romano and Wolf (2017) for more on applying weighted least squares. 
6 Excluding 2015, the average growth forecast errors for Ireland and Malta over the years 2013-2018 were 2.3 per 
cent and 2.8 per cent, respectively, for the SCP data and 2.5 per cent and 2.9 per cent for the Spring Forecast data.   
For the other 24 member states, the average growth forecast errors were 0.4 per cent for the SCPs and 0.5 per cent 




0.456 and 0.400 for this smaller sample.   We also consider an euro-area-only data sample.   In 
this case, the observations for the non-euro area member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden) are dropped, while the 2013 data 
for Latvia and 2013 and 2014 observations for Lithuania are also excluded as those two 
member states were not in the euro area in those years.   For this sample, the estimates of 𝜌 are 
above the baseline estimates, at 0.697 and 0.753. 
(iii) Controlling for other variables 
As well as assessing the influence of outliers, we also control for other variables that could 
cause changes to fiscal policy and output growth differing from expectation.   Consequently, 
equation (1) is augmented as follows: 
Forecast Error of ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜌 ∆𝐹𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1|𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
Where 𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1|𝑡 refers to the control variable, whose value in year 𝑡 − 1 is conditional on the 
information available on it in year 𝑡. 
The coefficient value on the control variable will indicate whether forecasters failed to capture 
accurately its influence on the growth rate, and, given the main focus here, on whether the 𝜌 
coefficient estimate is sensitive to it.   The tables in SCPs capture member states’ estimates of 
a number of relevant control variables and so those, and, in turn, the corresponding entries in 
the Spring Forecasts, are employed here.   The coefficient values in Table 2 are from a 
regression estimation of equation (2) by OLS with country fixed effects.   The baseline 
estimates of 𝜌 from Table 1 are shown in the initial row of Table 2.   The variables shown in 
the first column of Table 2 are the control variables that are included in turn alongside ∆𝐹𝑖,𝑡|𝑡 
in the regressions.  
The first control variable used is the General Government debt ratio for the past year (𝑡 − 1) 
contained in the SCP/Spring Forecast tables, marked as “Initial [i.e. 𝑡 − 1] debt ratio” in Table 
2.   The coefficient on this variable is 0.035 and 0.042 for the SCP and Spring Forecast samples, 
respectively, and is statistically significant, indicating that forecasters failed to capture this 
variable’s influence on output growth accurately.   The positive 𝛾 coefficient values in this case 




pessimistic and the higher the initial debt ratio the larger the positive growth rate forecast error 
that arises.7   
Table 2.  Results of the baseline regression, and augmented by control variables 




R-square F-test on 
fixed effects 
(P-value) 
a. SCPs      
Baseline  149 0.598 (3.650)  0.341 0.002 
Initial debt ratio 149 0.517 (3.104) 0.035 (2.017) 0.362 0.000 
Initial GDP growth rate 149 0.402 (2.448) -0.197 (-3.006) 0.387 0.000 
Initial output gap 149 0.541 (3.326) -0.186 (-2.394) 0.371 0.000 
      
b. Spring Forecast      
Baseline  149 0.565 (3.138)  0.345 0.001 
Initial debt ratio 149 0.497 (2.788) 0.042 (2.458) 0.376 0.000 
Initial GDP growth rate 149 0.325 (1.700) -0.199 (-3.033) 0.391 0.000 
Initial output gap 149 0.509 (2.840) -0.165 (-2.190) 0.370 0.000 
 
Two control variables reflecting output conditions in the economy – the initial GDP growth 
rate and the initial output gap – are also considered.   Table 2 shows these variables each have 
negative, significant coefficients.8   A positive (negative) initial GDP growth rate then leads 
forecasters to overestimate (underestimate) output growth rates in the current year, ceteris 
paribus.   Similarly, a positive (negative) output gap also leads to a forecast GDP growth rate 
that is greater (less) than the observed outturn.           
These results then indicate that during the 2013-2018 period both member states and the 
European Commission did not account satisfactorily for the effects of initial fiscal and output 
conditions on the projected GDP growth rate in year 𝑡 at the time of forecasting.   Throughout 
 
7 For the SCP panel, the average initial General Government debt-to-GDP ratio is 65.5 per cent, with a range of 
values from 9 per cent to 132.7 per cent.   For the Spring Forecast panel, the corresponding entries are 65.4 per 
cent, 9 per cent, and 132.7 per cent. 
8 In the SCP panel, the average initial GDP growth rate was 2 per cent, with 127 of the 149 observations having 
a positive growth rate.  The average initial output gap was -1.2 per cent with most observations (117 out of 149) 
having a negative value.   For the Spring Forecast panel, the averages GDP growth rate is 2 per cent with 127 of 





these regressions, the estimated 𝜌 coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels 
and ranges in value between 0.402 and 0.541 for the SCP data and 0.325 and 0.509 for the 
Spring Forecasts data. 
4. Conclusion 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013, 2014) find forecasters underestimating the effects of budgetary 
policy on output growth in the EU during the deep euro area recession of the early 2010s.   Our 
results indicate that, notwithstanding the lessons of the crisis and the EU fiscal and forecasting 
reforms that occurred in response, ex-ante multipliers are misestimated in the post-crisis period.   
While BL found fiscal multipliers to be underestimated during 2010-11, we find them to be 
overestimated in later years.   Forecasters are therefore still not capturing accurately the impact 
of fiscal policy on output growth rates.       
Empirical studies of fiscal multipliers find substantial variation in their values across countries 
and different stages of the economic cycle.   Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), for instance, 
find US fiscal multipliers fluctuating from close to zero in normal times up to 2.5 during 
recessions.   BL contend that if “normal times” multipliers are used in assessing the effects of 
fiscal retrenchment in a severe downturn then growth forecast errors should be systematically 
correlated with changes in the stance of fiscal policy, a hypothesis supported by their empirical 
work.   What our contribution shows is that this systematic relationship between growth 
forecast errors and fiscal policy has persisted in the more ‘normal’ years after the 2008-2012 
crisis period, albeit with an opposite sign and against a background of institutional reforms 
enacted in part to improve forecasting in the EU.9 10   Forecasters appear to have moved from 
underestimating the effect of fiscal policy on output growth in the downturn of the early 2010s 
to overestimating it subsequently.            
The empirical analysis in the paper drew on two forecast sets, those of member states in the 
SCPs and those of the European Commission in the Spring Forecasts.   A lack of substantial 
differences in forecasting accuracy across institutions is quite common in the literature (see, 
for example, Dohrn and Schmidt, 2011).   This is backed up here by the similarity of the results 
between the member states and the Commission.   It also suggests that the findings of Von 
Hagen (2010) and Merola and Perez (2013) - that the reliance of supra-national organisations 
 
9 GDP growth rate outturns averaged 2.7 per cent in the 149-observation dataset used here. 
10 Blanchard and Leigh (2014, p. 195) also applied their methodology to the pre-crisis period of 1997-2008 and 




on national governments for country information may cause those bodies to absorb the biases 
of the member states – may still hold.    
On a concluding and topical note, the Covid-19 pandemic that has arisen in early 2020 poses 
an unique and substantial challenge to European economies (and economies worldwide), with 
a large, sharp contraction of 7.5 per cent in euro area GDP expected in 2020 (IMF, 2020b).   
European governments are offsetting this contraction through fiscal stimulus.   Our central 
result of official appraisals of the effect of planned fiscal policy on output growth in the EU 
continue being misestimated in recent years should have a particular resonance given the thrust 
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